Pursuing and accepting hypotheses: a Peircean view of IBE by Nyrup, Rune
How explanatory reasoning justifies pursuit: a Peircean view of IBE
1. Introduction
The notion of an inference to best explanation (IBE) has attracted much attention in philosophy of
science since Gilbert Harman (1965) first coined the phrase.1 Most proponents of IBE (e.g. Psillos
1999, Lipton 2004, Douven 2011) take it to be a distinctive mode of non-deductive inference where
explanatory reasoning, i.e. considerations concerning what would be a good or the best explanation
of one or more phenomena, is used as a guide to theory choice. This form of reasoning, they hold,
plays  a  crucial  role  in  scientific  practice,  in  both  a  normative and a  descriptive  sense.  On the
descriptive side,  historical  examples  are  used to  argue that  scientists  often rely on explanatory
reasoning when choosing between theories or hypotheses.2 This descriptive point is then used to
justify the normative claim that the explanatoriness of hypotheses can be used to justify or give
reasons for choosing between them, and that this is generally a reliably, if fallible, guide to the truth.
The idea of an explanatory inference pre-dates its current popularity by at least a hundred
years.  From  1865  onwards,  C.S.  Peirce  promoted  an  inference,  which  he  called  abduction,
proceeding from the premise that a given hypothesis,  if it  were true, would make an otherwise
surprising fact “a matter of course” (CP 5.189).3 Recent scholarship has however emphasised that
Peirce's mature account of abduction differs significantly from the contemporary notion of IBE.4
Contemporary discussions usually assume that explanatory reasoning, at least in the form of IBE,
can  justify  accepting hypotheses  as  (approximately)  true.  They  thus  regard  it  as  a  species  of
inductive or ampliative inference. While Peirce agreed that abductions should guide our choices of
hypothesis, he only understood this in the sense of choosing which hypotheses to investigate further.
Peirce  held  that  only empirical  investigations  can  justify  accepting  a  hypothesis,  insisting  that
abductions  give  us  no  reason  to  regard  it  as  true,  except  insofar  as  these  lead  to  subsequent
empirical  testing.  He did regard abduction as a  form of inference – something which involves
giving  reasons  (whether  good or  bad)  –  and  not,  for  instance,  a  mere  heuristic  for  discovery.
However, these are reasons for  courses of action, viz. subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing,
1 IBE is also often invoked outside of philosophy of science, for instance to spell out the notion of coherence (e.g.
BonJour 1985) or as the methodological basis for metaphysics (e.g. Lewis 1986). See Day & Kincaid (1994) and
Minnameier (2004) for further examples and discussion.
2 Since the term 'theory' is often used ambiguously in philosophy of science (cf. Vickers 2013b) I shall generally
prefer the term 'hypothesis', in the sense of a fairly definite claim about some phenomenon or part of the world –
e.g. “the mass of the electron is approximately 1/1836 the mass of the proton”, “the extinction of the dinosaurs was
caused by a meteor”, “the structure of H2O is H-O-H”.
3 Following standard  conventions,  references  to  Peirce  (1932-1958)  are  abbreviated  as  CP [volume].[paragraph
number].
4 The following interpretation is defended especially clearly by McKaughan (2008). Cf. Also Kapitan (1992, 1997),
Hintikka (1998),  Minnameier  (2004),  Paavola (2006),  Campos (2011),  and Plutynski (2011).  Niiniluoto (1999)
gives a chronological review of the development of Peirce's views on abduction.
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rather than matters having to do with belief or acceptance (McKaughan 2008: 450 & 454).
In this paper I defend a view of the justificatory role in science of explanatory reasoning in
general, and IBE in particular, along the lines of these Peircean insights.5 Specifically, drawing on
the distinction between acceptance and pursuit (Laudan 1977; Franklin 1993a, 1993b), I propose to
see explanatory reasoning as first and foremost providing justification for pursuing a hypothesis, as
opposed to justification for accepting it. Call the latter view explanationism for short. The Peircean
view defended here, I argue, enjoys two advantages over explanationism.
The first concerns what Peter Lipton (2004) calls  Voltaire's Objection to explanationism:
why should we regard a hypothesis as any more likely to be actually true just because it would be a
better explanation if it  were true? The Peircean view side-steps this problem, since it requires no
general  connection between explanatoriness and truth.  Furthermore,  the Peircean view faces  no
analogous problem either. As I shall show, there is a simple and straightforward connection between
good explanations and justification for pursuit, based on the kinds of “economical” considerations
Peirce emphasised as being crucial to abduction. I introduce Voltaire's Objection in section 2 and
explain why it  poses a problem to explanationism. In section 3,  I  present a general account of
pursuit and then, in section 4, show how explanatory reasoning can justify pursuit.
Second, I argue that once the Peircean view is on the table, this undercuts several of the
empirical arguments for the reliability of IBE proposed by explanationists. Firstly, it challenges the
argument  that,  since  scientific  practice  relies  extensively on explanatory reasoning and science
generally leads to (approximately) true theories, IBE is generally a reliable form of inference. For
this  effectively  commits  a  fallacy  of  composition,  ignoring  the  possibility  that  explanatory
reasoning play a justificatory role different from indicating the likeliness of hypotheses being true.
Secondly, the Peircean view provides an equally or more descriptively adequate account of many of
the historical case studies that are used to motivate explanationism. Thus, the Peircean view is at
least as well supported by these case studies as explanationism. I lay out these criticisms in sections
5 and 6.
2. Voltaire's Objection
The slogan that one should infer “the best” explanation conceals an important distinction. For there
are at least two senses in which an explanation can be better than its competitors, and these should
be kept separate when evaluating explanatory inferences (Lipton 2004: ch. 4). In the first case, a
5 I do not claim that what I here call “the Peircean view” is the most plausible interpretation of Peirce's considered
views  on abduction,  much less  that  it  captures  everything Peirce ever  wrote about  it  (he  discussed abduction
extensively  throughout  his  career,  often  modifying  or  rejecting  his  previous  views  –  cf.  McKaughan  2008;
Niiniluoto 1999). Rather, I simply use it as a name for the view, inspired by Peirce, which I here defend in the
context of the contemporary debate.
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hypothesis may be the likeliest explanation relative to the other competing hypotheses considered.
The likeliness of an explanation has to do with truth – i.e. it is the explanation which we regard as
most likely to be true, or closest to the truth. In the limiting case scientists may be able to rule out,
or make highly improbable, all plausible alternative explanations in light of the available evidence
and  accepted  background  theories.  Here,  the  remaining  explanatory  hypothesis  would  be  the
likeliest available explanation, and in this sense the best. Since scientists generally aim to discover
good  explanations,  if  a  hypothesis  H is  the  likeliest  available  explanation  of  some  otherwise
surprising phenomenon, they would be justified in accepting H. At least as far as I am concerned
this is a perfectly cogent inference and nothing I say in this paper aims to challenge it. As Lipton is
careful to point out,  IBE is only interesting as an inductive inference to the extent that it  goes
beyond merely being an inference to the likeliest explanation. 
The sense of “best explanation” that is of interest to explanationists concerns how good an
explanation we would deem a hypothesis H to be, if it were true. Let us say that the explanatoriness
of H depends on the amount and quality of the explanations H would provide, if it were true. Or,
since the “goodness” of explanations is usually taken to concern how much understanding they give
us, the explanatoriness of  H can also be seen as the amount of understanding it could potentially
afford us.6 Assessing this requires subjunctive reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what would be the
case – viz. how much understanding it would provide – if  H were true. We can call this kind of
reasoning  explanatory reasoning. What explanationists claim, then, is that explanatory reasoning
can give us some additional or independent reason to accept a hypothesis as true (or approximately
true). In other words, they regard the explanatoriness of a hypothesis as a guide to its likeliness.
This claim is however also what makes the explanationist account of IBE controversial. One
question  concerns  what  “good  explanations”  means.  There  are  many  different  accounts  of
explanation (causal, unification, etc.), and proponents of these variably emphasise certain virtues
(being simple, unifying, coherent, elegant, quantitatively precise, specifying a mechanism, etc.) as
characteristic of good explanations. Many explanationists (e.g. Lipton 2004: ch 4; Psillos 2009: ch.
10) prefer to stay neutral on what defines good explananations. Since my argument in this paper
will  not  depend  on  any particular  view  of  explanation  or  of  how they give  us  understanding
(however we conceive of this), I am likewise happy to stay neutral on these matters.
Explanationism however faces a more pressing problem – what Peter Lipton (2004, ch. 9)
calls  Voltaire's Objection. As critics have pointed out, the fact that a hypothesis would be a good
explanation of something, if it were true, does not, prima facie, seem to have any implications for
6 Explanatoriness is my preferred term for what Lipton calls the “loveliness” of an explanation.
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whether it is actually true.7 Indeed, this seems worryingly close to a form of wishful thinking. So
why should  this  give  us  any  additional  reason  to  accept  the  hypothesis?8 Of  course,  like  all
inductive  inferences,  IBE  would  be  fallible,  and  so  explanationists  should  not  be  expected  to
guarantee its success. Nonetheless, they ought to provide some reason to think that explanatoriness
is generally a reliable guide to likeliness, i.e. that it generally tends to take us closer to the truth.
Douven (2011: sec. 3.2) mentions that few, if any, explanationists would think the reliability
of IBE can be defended on a priori grounds. Consequently, they have instead proposed empirical
arguments, based on historical case studies where explanatory reasoning seems to have played an
important  role  in  scientific  practice.  Since  these  practices  have  generally  been  reliable,
explanationists argue, we have a good reason to think IBE is itself a reliable inference. I examine
some variants of this arguments in section 5. First, I want to argue, in the following two sections,
that the Peircean view of explanatory reasoning avoids Voltaire's Objection and, furthermore, faces
no analogous problem.
3. Pursuing hypotheses and justifying it
In  his  astute  exegetical  study  of  Peirce's  views  on  abduction,  Daniel  McKaughan  (2008)
distinguishes  three  general  interpretations:  the  Generative  Interpretation,  the  Justificatory
Interpretation,  and  the  Pursuitworthiness  Interpretation.  The  Justificatory  Interpretation
corresponds  to  explanationism,  where  abduction  is  taken  to  provide  justification  for  accepting
hypotheses as true or approximately true.  This view is typically contrasted with the Generative
Interpretation, associated with Hanson (1958).9 Hanson argued that it is a significant philosophical
task  to  analyse  the  processes  through  which  scientific  theories  are  formulated,  generated  or
discovered,  promoting  Peirce's  abduction  as  such  an  analysis.  Popper  (1959/1935)  and  the
positivists,  he  argued,  were  mistaken  in  restricting  philosophy of  science  to  questions  of  how
evidence  justifies  the  acceptance  of  theories,  relegating  all  other  issues  to  empirical  sociology,
psychology or history.10
McKaughan argues that these two interpretations overlook an important step in the process
of inquiry between the initial formulation of a hypothesis and its acceptance or rejection as part of
established scientific knowledge. Apart from formulating and developing hypotheses to investigate,
scientists,  in  order  to  prioritise  their  time,  resources,  and  efforts,  furthermore  need  to  make
7 In Lipton's Voltairean phrase: why should we think that we live in the loveliest of all possible worlds?
8 E.g. van Fraassen (1980), Cartwright (1983); see Barnes (1995) for a sustained criticism along these lines directed
specifically at Lipton (2004), and Roche & Sober (2013) for a recent probabilistic formulation of the problem.
9 E.g. Paavola (2006).
10 The Hansonian view received much attention by post-Kuhnian historically minded philosophers. Nickles (1980a,
1980b) contains several papers by these “friends of discovery”.
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decisions regarding which of these to investigate or develop further. In other words, scientists need
to make decision regarding which hypotheses are most worthy of further pursuit.11 As McKaughan
shows, this was a dominant theme especially in Peirce's later discussions of abduction – thus, the
Pursuitworthiness Interpretation. It is this aspect of Peirce's views on which I draw in the following.
The distinction between  accepting and  pursuing  a hypothesis was first proposed by Larry
Laudan (1977: 108-114, 1980: 174). Laudan noticed that, historically, scientists have often chosen
to work on scientific theories despite these having have major empirical and conceptual problems
relative  to  the  dominant  views,  citing,  amongst  others,  Copernicanism,  the  atomic  theory,  and
quantum  mechanics  in  their  early  stages.  By  distinguishing  between  pursuing  and  accepting,
Laudan argued, we can make sense of why it was rational for scientists to pursue these theories
even though they had strong reasons to accept competing theories.12 More recently, Allan Franklin
(1993a, 1993b) has argued that certain episodes in particle physics are best understood as cases
where physicists chose to pursue hypotheses before they had reasons to accept them. Indeed, some
of the physicists involved were quite convinced of their falsehood whilst pursuing them.13
Franklin's  examples  are  especially  suggestive  for  present  purposes,  since  these  concern
hypotheses that were pursued exactly because of their potential for explaining otherwise puzzling
phenomena. For example, Franklin (1986, ch. 1) discusses the rejection by particle physicists of the
so-called principle of parity conversation. The puzzling phenomenon physicists faced was this: for a
particular set of decay patterns, the principle that each particles has a unique mass indicated that
they stem from a single particle, while the principle of parity conversation ruled this out. When the
physicists T.D. Lee and C.N. Yang in 1956 proposed that parity conversation may be violated in
weak  interactions,  and  suggested  experiments  to  test  this  hypothesis,  it  sparked  an  intense
experimental interest. It should be noted, first, that the same hypothesis had earlier been suggested
as a logical possibility, but without being proposed as a solution to the above puzzle and without
arousing much interest (Franklin 1986: 29f). Second, many of the physicists involved were quite
convinced that the experiments would falsify the hypothesis.14
Apart from the descriptive point that scientist often actually do make and argue for decisions
about which hypotheses to pursue, there are also normative reasons why scientists ought to justify
11 Pursuing a hypothesis is generally taken to involve at least two aspects: (i) subjecting it to empirical testing and (ii)
developing it theoretically, e.g. clarifying it, resolving conceptual problems, or removing apparent tensions with
other accepted theories (Laudan 1977, Whitt 1990). I mostly focus on (i) in this paper.
12 Laudan was here using the distinction to defend the rationality of science against challenges from Feyerabend.
13 One of Franklin's concerns is to show,  pace  Pickering (1984), that these episodes were guided and decided by
evidential considerations.
14 Franklin reports (1986: 24) that Richard Feynman bet Norman Ramsey $50 to $1 that the experiments would fail to
show parity violation – and ended up paying!
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such choices.15 The reason is pragmatic: the resources available to scientists are scarce but human
imagination is abundant. In Peirce's words:
Proposals for hypotheses inundate us in an overwhelming flood, while the process of verification to
which each one must be subjected before it can count as at all an item, even of likely knowledge, is so
very costly in time, energy, and money—and consequently in ideas which might have been had for
that time, energy, and money, that Economy would override every other consideration even if there
were any other serious considerations. In fact there are no others. (CP 5.602)16
In other  words,  scientists  need to  justify  which  hypotheses  are  worth investigating  in  order  to
optimise the epistemic output of their resources.
Let  me  emphasise,  however,  that  although  it  concerns  practical  and  pragmatic  factors,
justification for pursuit is not wholly detached from epistemic matters. On the contrary, choosing
which hypotheses to pursue concerns how to maximise the epistemic output of science.17 This also
makes it slightly misleading to characterise the distinction as one between justification and pursuit.
Although the two are sometimes conflated, the distinction between (justification for) accepting and
pursuing  hypotheses  cuts  across  the  much  discussed  distinction  between  context  of
discovery/context of justification.18 Choices regarding which hypotheses to accept as well as which
to pursue can and ought to be justified. The difference is that acceptance concerns which hypotheses
are  more  likely  to  be  to  true,  given  our  background  knowledge  and  evidence,  whereas  the
justification for pursuing hypotheses involves practical reasoning about which courses of action to
follow, given our resources, overall goals and available information.19
How should we characterise justification for pursuit, then? McKaughan summarises Peirce's
answer as follows: “If we estimate that testing the hypothesis will be easy, of potential interest, and
informative, then we should give it a high priority” (2008: 457). Peirce himself mentions “cost, the
value of the thing proposed, in itself; and its effect upon other projects” (CP 7.220; cf. McKaughan
2008: 467, note 12). Similarly, Franklin (1993a: 122) observes from his case studies that “[t]he
decision to pursue an investigation seems to depend on a weighting of at least three factors; the
15 Further  case  studies  of  pursuit  are  discussed  by  Whitt  (1990,  1992),  Achinstein  (1993)  McKinney  (1995),
McKaughan (2008), Šešelja & Weber (2012), and Patton (2012).
16 Peirce frequently connects “economical” considerations to his account of abduction; see McKaughan (2008: 452ff)
for further references.
17 Šešelja, Kosolosky, & Straßer (2012) distinguish justifying pursuit relative to purely epistemic goals as opposed to
widers  set  of  social,  moral,  and  epistemic  goals.  Kitcher  (2011)  is  an example  of  someone  who  discusses
justification for pursuit in this broader sense. I here focus on the epistemic aspects of justification for pursuit.
18 Laudan (1980: 174) characterises the context of pursuit as a “nether region” between discovery/generation and
(ultimate) justification. In my view, the “context” terminology is still somewhat misleading: these are not separated
phases or contexts of scientific inquiry, but often co-occuring or interweaving. See furthermore Schickore & Steinle
(2006) on the context-distinction.
19 McKaughan (2008: 454); cf. Kapitan (1992, 1997).
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interest  of the hypothesis, its plausibility,  and its ease of test”. He also mentions (1993b) more
purely pragmatic concerns such as “recycling expertise” or being able to continue already ongoing
research programmes.
Building on these remarks, I characterise justification for pursuit as consisting in weighing
and ranking the salient competing hypotheses in terms of pragmatic factors such as:
• the expected cost of testing the hypotheses (in terms of time, money, energy, computational
power, etc.),
• how easy it would be to carry out these tests,
• how likely we think it  is  that  these tests  will  give  us  clear  evidence  for  or  against  the
hypotheses,
• how interesting  the  hypotheses  are,  including  (crucially  for  my purposes)  whether  they
would allow us to explain otherwise puzzling phenomena,
• whether carrying out these tests are likely to reveal other interesting facts about the world,
and
• the effects on other project, e.g. whether pursuing a given hypothesis will allow scientists to
extend experimental paradigms already used in many other contexts.
Inferences which produce justification for pursuit, on this conception, are ones which change our
estimates of these factors, thus changing the ranking of the hypotheses considered.
It can be helpful to think of proposal along the lines of a simple, slightly formalised model,
where the connection, stressed by Peirce, to “economical” considerations is more explicit. When
deciding between a set of possible courses of action, in order to best use our resources we ought to
choose that course which optimises the expected outcome relative to the expected costs of following
that course of action. For the present case, then, let E(pursue(H)) abbreviate the expected epistemic
outcome of pursuing a hypothesis H and let C(pursue(H)) be the expected costs of pursuing H. The
expected epistemic outcome can computed as follows. Let P(Oi | pursue(H)) be the probability of
the outcome Oi obtaining given that H is pursued, and let V(Oi) be the epistemic value associated
with that outcome obtaining. Then the expected epistemic outcome can be defined as E(pursue(H))
=  ∑  [P(Oi |  pursue(H))∙V(Oi)].  Given  this, we  can  construe  the  justification  for  pursuing  a
hypothesis, JP(H), in terms of the quantity
(1) JP(H) = ∑ [P(Oi | pursue(H))∙V(Oi)]/C(pursue(H)) 
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Within  this  model,  inferences  producing  justification  for  pursuit  will  be  ones  that  change  the
ranking induced by (1) on a set of competing hypotheses.
Let me stress that this model is both very idealised and abstract. I do not suppose that it is
generally  possible  to  make  anything  but  rough  estimates  or  comparisons  of  these  quantities.
Furthermore, the estimates of individual scientists, as well as what they take the most important
epistemic  outcomes  of  science  to  be,  will  probably  vary  significantly.  I  do  not  have  any
comprehensive account of these matters. Finally, scientists obviously do not always conform to or
even approximate this model in their deliberations about which hypotheses to pursue; nor do I claim
that  it  would  be  better  if  they  did.  Nonetheless,  I  find  that  this  model  can  provide  a  useful
framework for expressing and clarifying issues regarding justification for pursuit.
To illustrate, consider two salient outcomes of pursuing a hypothesis: learning (or getting
strong evidence) either that it is true or false. One way to interpret the claim that a hypothesis H is
easily tested is that the probability of learning that H is true or false, given that one pursues H – i.e.
that P(learn(H) |  pursue(H)) or P(learn(~H) |  pursue(H)) is significantly above zero. Reasoning
which shows this  to  be the case would,  all  things  being equal,  increase  JP(H),  since it  would
presumably always be more epistemically valuable to learn either that a hypothesis is true or that it
is false, than not learning anything about its truth. So when Peirce, for instance, claims that 
the best hypothesis … is the one which can be the most readily refuted if it is false. This far outweighs
the trifling merit of being likely (CP 1.120)
this  would  be  case  where  P(learn(~H)  |  pursue(H))  is  sufficiently  high,  and  C[pursue(H)]
sufficiently low, to rank H above the other candidate hypotheses.
4. How explanatory reasoning justifies pursuit
I claim that the Peircean view avoids Voltaire's Objection. But consider the following objection: the
justification  to  pursue  a  hypothesis,  at  the  very  least,  involves  showing  the  hypothesis  to  be
minimally plausible or probable. Indeed, Peirce sometimes says that abductions give us “reason to
suspect that [the hypothesis] is true” (CP 5.189) or reasons “regarded as lending the hypothesis
some  plausibility”  (CP 2.511,  footnote)  and  that  “[c]ertain  premises  will  render  an  hypothesis
probable, so that there is such a thing as legitimate hypothetic inference [i.e. abduction]” (loc. cit.).
But  if  this  is  the  case,  the  Peircean  view  would  also  require  some connection  between
explanatoriness and likeliness (or plausibility). Even if it would be a weaker one than that required
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by explanationism,  this  is  still  sufficient  for  a  version  of  Voltaire's  Objection  to  apply  to  the
Peircean view as well.
The premise  of  this  objection  is  mistaken.  Justification  for  pursuit  need  not  stem from
showing the hypothesis any more probable or plausible than before. In particular, this is not how
explanatory inferences, on my account, justify pursuit.20 Now, it might be argued that a hypothesis
needs some minimal degree of plausibility in order for it to be worth pursuing at all.  If this is
correct, then one way of justifying the pursuit of a hypothesis is to show that it is more plausible
than previously thought. However, this is not the only way. For one thing, it could equally be argued
that a hypothesis is only worth investigating if it is not completely trivial or obvious. Thus, one can
equally  justify  pursuing  a  hypothesis  by  showing  that  there  is  more  reason  to  doubt  it  than
previously thought.
More  importantly  for  my  argument,  however,  that  a  hypothesis  is  neither  completely
implausible nor completely trivial is not sufficient to justify pursuing it, at least not if the costs of
doing so are non-negligible.21 To see this, focus again on the outcomes of learning whether H is true
or false. Now, as remarked above, one factor in evaluating this outcome is how probable one takes it
to be that pursuing H will reveal whether it is true or false. This depends, in part, on its plausibility,
but  also on how difficult  it  would be to  test  it.  The other  relevant  factor  is  how epistemically
valuable  it  would  be  to  learn  whether  H is  true  or  false:  if  the  hypothesis  is  sufficiently
uninteresting,  this  may well  outweigh the  costs  of  pursuing it.  This  is  where  I  want  to  argue
explanatory  reasoning  comes  into  the  picture.  My  claim  is  that  by  showing  that  H is  more
explanatory than previously thought – e.g. by showing that if it  were true,  H  would be able to
explain an otherwise surprising or puzzling phenomenon – we show that it would be more valuable
than previously thought to learn whether H is true, thereby raising the justification for pursuing it.
To spell  out  this  argument  a  bit  further,  notice  first  that  the  epistemic  goals  of  science
concern more than simply knowing as many truths as possible. As Phillip Kitcher (1993: 94) puts
the point: 
Tacking truths together is something any hack can do. … The trouble is that most of the truths that can
be acquired in these ways are boring. Nobody is interested in the minutiae of the shapes and colors of
the  objects  in  your  vicinity,  the  temperature  fluctuations  in  your  microenvironment,  the  infinite
20 As for  Peirce,  he eventually came to regard his  earlier  writings as  having mixed up induction and  abduction
(Niiniluoto 1999: S441; McKaughan 2008: 453f).
21 This  is  probably  not  even  necessary.  As  Franklin  (1993a:  ch.  3)  points  out,  physicists  sometimes  pursue
experimental work on a hypothesis after they regard it as conclusively falsified. Experimental research have other
uses beyond merely generating evidence for or against some particular hypothesis – they have “a life of their own”
(Hacking 1983). Correspondingly, my model allows for other valuable outcomes of pursuing hypotheses besides
learning whether they are true or false.
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number of disjunctions you can generate with your favorite true statement as one disjunct, or the
probabilities of the events in the many chance setups you can contrive with objects in your vicinity.
What we want is significant truth.
There are  plenty of  truths  out  there that  could be discovered and at  much lower cost than the
questions actually pursued by scientists. The value of scientific knowledge depends on other factors
beyond merely the amount of truths known, no matter how certain.
Now, what these additional factors are – what other “epistemic goods”, as we might call
them, are  important  in  science – is  not something we need to  give a  general  account  of  here.
However,  most  philosophers  of  science,  and  explanationists  in  particular,  seem  to  regard
explanation  and understanding as  being  among them.22 So  one way a hypothesis  can  be  more
epistemically valuable than merely being true is by being a good explanation, i.e. by increasing our
understanding  of  the  phenomena  scientists  investigate.  Philosophers  may  disagree  about  why
explanation and understanding are epistemically valuable – maybe they are intrinsically valuable, or
maybe they are only valuable as a means to achieving other important epistemic goals. However, all
I need for the present argument is that explanation/understanding is in fact epistemically valuable.
Consider  again  the  premise  of  an  IBE:  that  the  hypothesis  H would  provide  the  most
understanding out of a set of rival explanations, if it were true. Thus, if we were to learn that H is
actually true,  this  would be  an  epistemically valuable  outcome.  Indeed,  learning that  the  most
explanatory hypothesis is true would be the optimal epistemic outcome as far as explanation and
understanding are concerned. What if we instead learn that H is false? As mentioned earlier, this is
still more valuable than not knowing whether  H is true or false. Furthermore, it does seem more
valuable to learn that the most explanatory salient hypothesis is false, than learning the falsity of a
less interesting hypothesis. For one thing, learning that the most attractive option is closed off will
help us redirect our resources to other worthwhile projects that are actually achievable. One might
also argue that there is  something intrinsically valuable about knowing that the most appealing
explanation  is  actually  false.  (All  I  need  for  my  argument,  however,  is  that  it  is  not  less
epistemically valuable to learn the falsity of the most explanatory hypothesis). Suppose, then, that
everything else is held equal between a set of rival hypotheses: the costs of pursuing them are the
same, we regard it as equally likely that pursuing them will allow to us learn whether they are true
or false, all other expected epistemic outcomes of pursuing them are equal, and so on. In this case,
given  the  account  of  justification  for  pursuit  outlined  above,  scientists  would  be  justified  in
pursuing the most explanatory hypothesis.
22 For instance, Kitcher (1993: 105ff) discusses “Explanatory Progress” as one of the goals pursued by science beyond
mere truth.
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This, in a nutshell, is my account of how IBE justifies pursuit. The argument just presented
furthermore applies to explanatory reasoning more generally: showing that a hypothesis H, if true,
would  explain  an  otherwise  surprising  fact  raises  the  epistemic  value  associated  with  learning
whether H is true or not. This, all else being equal, increases the justification for pursuing H.
Let me close this section by emphasising the generality of my argument. It only rests on the
premise  that  it,  all  else  being  equal,  is  more  epistemically  valuable  to  know  whether  more
explanatory hypotheses are true or false than less explanatory ones. In particular, it does not rely on
any  specific  account  of  explanation  or  of  why  explanations  are  valuable.  Combined  with  the
account of justification for pursuit outlined in section 3, I hope to have convincingly shown that
there  is  a  simple  and  straightforward  connection  between  IBE,  explanatory  reasoning,  and
justification for pursuit. I conclude that the Peircean view faces no obvious analogue of Voltaire's
Objection.
5. Empirical arguments for explanationism
As mentioned in section 2, explanationists often cite historical case studies where scientists seem to
have  relied  on  explanatory  reasoning.  They  argue  on  the  basis  of  these  that  IBE  provides  a
descriptively adequate account of this aspect of scientific reasoning, which is in itself significant if
we want to understand how scientific reasoning actually proceeds.23 On the normative side, many
explanationists furthermore hope to answer Voltaire's Objection by deriving an argument for the
reliability of IBE from this descriptive point.
In  this  section  and  the  next  I  argue  that  the  Peircean  view  challenges  and  potentially
undermines  this  strategy for  defending  explanationism.  The  problem is  that  the  Peircean  view
provides an alternative interpretation of explanatory reasoning in science which is usually not taken
into account in these arguments. If the Peircean view turns out to be more descriptively adequate
than explanationism, this would undermine the empirical premise on which these arguments rely. Of
course there are many possible ways to argue empirically for the reliability of IBE, and I cannot
address all of them here. Instead, I examine a few influential variants of this argument, showing
how each of them relies on the descriptive premise and how the Peircen view challenges it. In the
next section, I argue that the Peircean view indeed provides a plausible interpretation of several of
the case studies often cited by explanationists.
Consider first a rather general line of argument which connects the reliability of IBE closely
to the question of scientific realism. Here is how Douven (2011: sec. 3.2) summarises the crucial
23 Lipton  (2004)  explicitly  claims  this  as  the  main  virtue  of  his  account  of  IBE.  Douven  (2011,  sec.  1.2)  also
emphasises the “ubiquity” of explanatory reasoning in both everyday, scientific, and philosophical contexts.
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step in Boyd's (1980, 1983) argument (Douven here uses “abduction” to refer to IBE):
Boyd then argues that the reliability of scientific methodology is best explained by assuming that the
theories on which it  relies are at  least  approximately true.  From this and from the fact  that  these
theories were mostly arrived at by abductive reasoning, he concludes that abduction must be a reliable
rule of inference.
Lipton (2004: 148) similarly connects the normative and descriptive ambitions of explanationism:
My is hope is rather that by this stage you are convinced of the descriptive merits of explanationism,
so insofar as you believe that our actual practices are reliable, you will tend to discount Voltaire's
objection.
Now, many philosophers have questioned whether the historical evidence actually favours scientific
realism.24 Furthermore,  some take  this  argument  to  beg the  question  against  anti-realists,  since
arguments for scientific realism tend to rely on a form of IBE.25 But since my aim here is not to
challenge scientific realism I am willing to grant these points for the sake of the argument. Rather, I
argue that even when granting this, the argument fails to support its conclusion. 
To see this, notice that the argument is supposed to run from the premises
(Realism)  Scientific  methodology  relies  on  theories  that  are  mostly  true  or
approximately true.
and
(IBE in scientific practice) These theories were mostly arrived at through IBEs (or at
least by explanatory reasoning).
to the conclusion 
(Explanationism) IBE is generally a reliable rule of inference.
But stated this way, the argument clearly commits a fallacy of composition. For the most that can be
concluded  from  the  fact  that  science  generally  leads  to  true  hypothesis  is  that  scientific
methodologies taken as a whole are reliable. It does not follow that any particular inferential pattern
in science on its own is reliable as well. As illustrated by the Peircean view, explanatory reasoning
may play an important  justificatory role  in  science (e.g.  choosing which hypothesis  to  pursue)
24 See e.g. Saatsi (2012) and Vickers (2013a) for recent discussion of the relation between historical evidence and the
scientific realism debate. The classical statement of this objection is Laudan (1981).
25 For discussion see Psillos (1999: ch. 4) and Lipton (2004: ch. 11).
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without being a reliable guide to truth. Thus, one can grant the premises of this argument while
holding that IBE is wholly unreliable when divorced from subsequent empirical testing.
A slightly more subtle way of spelling out Boyd's argument (discussed e.g. by Psillos 1999:
ch.  9,  Lipton 2004:  148ff)  emphasises  the  point  that  explanatory reasoning itself  relies  on  the
theories we already accept – e.g. for generating plausible candidate explanations, or for evaluating
their explanatoriness. So if we regard these background theories as generally true, the argument
goes, we should regard the methods that rely on them as being generally reliable. But this argument
presumes that explanatory reasoning aims at choosing the likeliest hypothesis. If the Peircean view
captures  the  role  played  by explanatory reasoning,  however,  this  is  simply not  the  purpose  of
explanatory reasoning. Supposing it does rely on background theories, there is still no reason to
think that this would make IBE reliable with regards to something it does not aim at accomplishing.
Consider  finally the  more  direct  strategy for  testing  the  reliability of  IBE suggested  by
Douven (2002, 2005). Douven argues that we can, under certain circumstances, regard cases where
a hypothesis inferred through an IBE is confirmed by other empirical methods as evidence of the
reliability of IBE.26 For instance, if we infer through IBE that a certain microbe exists, and we
subsequently observe this microbe in a microscope, this convergence provides evidence both of the
reliability of IBE and of microscopes.27
One objection that could be raised to this argument is whether we should expect there to be a
completely domain-general argument for the reliability of an abstract inferential schema, such as
IBE.28 Even if we bracket this concern, notice furthermore that the kind of cases that could lend
support to explanationism on this account would exactly be cases where we have some independent
empirical test of the hypothesis. In these cases the Peircean account suggests a relevant alternative
interpretation, namely that the explanatory reasoning merely justified pursuing the hypothesis and
only the empirical testing justifies our accepting it. Again, if a given case study is more plausibly
interpreted along Peircean lines, this would undermine its support for explanationism. Furthermore,
while explanationism can only be supported by cases where we have empirical reasoning to believe
the hypothesis is true, the Peircean view can also account for those cases where empirical testing
falsifies  or  fails  to  support  it.  In  both  cases  the Peircean can  argue that  explanatory reasoning
justified pursuing the hypothesis. (I illustrate this point in the next section).
26 Douven (2002)  relies  on  Glymour's  (1980)  bootstrapping procedure,  while  Douven (2005)  develops a  similar
argument on the basis of Bayesian confirmation theory. Douven takes his formal accounts to be related to similar
arguments found in Harré (1988), Bird (1998), and Kitcher (2001).
27 This example draws on Hacking's (1983: ch. 11) argument for the reliability of microscopy.
28 Saatsi (2009) raises this objection to empirical arguments for the reliability of IBE, drawing on Norton's (2003)
“material theory of induction”.
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6. The descriptive adequacy of the Peircean view
The  empirical  arguments  for  the  reliability  of  IBE  will  be  undermined  or  at  least  seriously
challenged if  it  can  be shown that  explanatory reasoning primarily plays  the  role  of  justifying
pursuit rather than acceptance of hypotheses. I do not here have the space to argue that Peircean
view is in general the most plausible interpretation in all  historical cases involving explanatory
reasoning. To illustrate its descriptive potential, nonetheless, I examine a number of the case studies
usually cited by explanationists, arguing that in these cases the Peircean view provides an at least as
plausible interpretation.
6.1. Semmelweis
Consider  first  the  case  of  Ignaz  Semmelweis'  investigation  of  childbed  fever,  a  fatal  disease
affecting many women giving birth in one of the maternity wards where he worked in Vienna in the
1840s. Lipton (2004: ch. 5) draws extensively on this case in order to support his descriptive claim
that scientific inferential practices often proceeds via explanatory considerations. Lipton stresses
that  at  several  points  in  his  investigations,  Semmelweis  considered  what  would  explain  the
differences in fatality rates at the two wards. Going through a number of potential explanations, and
testing these, Semmelweis in the end hypothesised that the infections were caused by “cadaverous
particles”.  The  crucial  difference  between  the  two  wards,  according  this  hypothesis,  was  that
medical students, who had just performed autopsies, delivered children in the first ward but not in
the  second.  Disinfecting  the  hands  of  the  students  seemed  to  lower  the  infection  rates,  thus
vindicating Semmelweis' hypothesis.
As Sami Paavola (2006) argues in detail, Semmelweis' explanatory reasoning in this case
only seems to play the role of suggesting hypotheses to Semmelweis, which he then went on to test
empirically. The Peircean can thus hold that it was empirical testing, and not explanatory reasoning
per se, which justified accepting Semmelweis' hypothesis.29 
Furthermore, Dana Tudlockziecki (2013) has recently challenged the standard version of this
story. As she shows, Semmelweis failed to convince many of his contemporaries, simply because
his reasoning was not  as flawless as many philosophers seem to suppose.  Semmelweis'  crucial
disagreement with his contemporaries was that childbed fever had one and only one cause (most
were  willing  to  agree  that  cadaverous  particles  played  some  role  in  causing  the  disease).
Tudlockziecki (2013: 1074-5) concludes that:
29 Paavola  uses  this  case  study  to  argue  in  favour  of  a  Hansonian,  i.e.  generative,  view  of  abduction  over
explanationism.  He  does  not  consider  the  pursuitworthiness  interpretation  adopted  here.  As  far  as  I  can  tell,
Paavola's analysis supports the pursuitworthiness interpretation at least as well as the generative interpretation.
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Semmelweis simply did not provide any convincing reason to subscribe to the monocausality thesis.
When Semmelweis was, reasonably, asked to perform certain experiments that could have supported
his thesis, he declined, and, in addition, it  was pointed out that the monocausality thesis failed to
explain  several  salient  phenomena  associated  with  childbed  fever  that  could  be  explained  on  a
multicausal view
In this case then, to the extent that explanatory reasoning was successful, it seems to have been in
proposing hypothesis for further testing. It was exactly when Semmelweis strayed from this strategy
that his arguments lost their force. Notice that the monocausality view is both more unifying and
simple explanation of childbed fever than a complex multiplicity of causes. On an explanationist
view, this would seem to provide some reason to favour the hypothesis. But in fact, the explanatory
potential of the monocausal hypothesis seems to bear little relevance to the objections raised by the
critics. This is of course exactly the conclusion that the Peircean would come to: no amount of
explanatoriness can outweigh the requirement of empirical testing. Of course, I do not claim that
any defenders of explanationism would hold otherwise. Nonetheless, explanationism would require
some additional account to accommodate this aspect of the Semmelweis case. In contrast to this, the
core tenets of the Peircean view account directly for the weaknesses of Semmelweis' arguments.
6.2. Experimental reasoning
Another class of cases sometimes invoked by explanationists is the establishment of experimental
results. For instance, Douven (2011: sec. 1.2) cites the reasoning J. J. Thomson employed to argue
that  cathode  rays  consist  of  “charges  of  negative  electricity  carried  by  particles  of  matter”.
According to Douven, 
The conclusion that cathode rays consist of negatively charged particles does not follow logically from
the reported  experimental  results,  nor  could Thomson draw on any relevant  statistical  data.  That
nevertheless he could “see no escape from the conclusion” is, we may safely assume, because the
conclusion is the best—in this case presumably even the only plausible—explanation of his results
that he could think of. 
However, if this was the only plausible explanation available to Thomson, this is only an instance of
inference to the  likeliest explanation – i.e. a case where all plausible alternative explanations are
ruled out or made highly unlikely by the evidence – and not a case where explanatoriness functions
as an additional indicator of likeliness. As pointed out in section 2, the Peircean view does not
challenge the former type of inference, so this case is of little help to explanationists.
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This analysis of experimental reasoning applies most similar cases. Consider for instance the
series of experiments that Pieter Zeeman conducted in order to demonstrate what is today know as
the Zeeman effect (Arabatzis 1992): that the spectral lines emitted by a given source, such as the
vapours from a piece of heated sodium, can be caused to split by placing the source in a magnetic
field.30 During  1896  Zeeman  carefully  went  through  a  series  of  gradually  more  complicated
experiments to show that the action of the magnetic field was the only plausible source of the
observed effect. For instance, Zeeman was worried that the effect might be due to differences in the
density vapours in  his  test  tube.  To eliminate  this  effect,  he reproduced the experiment  with a
smaller tube which he furthermore rotated around its axis in order to achieve an equal distribution
of the gas. Of course, Zeeman's experiments did not  entail this conclusion, and in this sense one
could say that he merely inferred the best explanation. But given Zeeman's background knowledge
and the results of his experiments, he was justified in regarding the action of the magnetic field as
the only plausible explanation of the effect. Thus, also in this case we are only dealing with an
inference to the likeliest, rather than the most explanatory, hypothesis.
More generally,  Franklin (2009: sec. 1.1.1; cf. 1986: ch. 6, 1990: ch. 6) has summarised a
number of epistemological strategies commonly employed by experimental physicists to establish
the veracity of their results. Nowhere on Franklin's list does typical explanatory virtues (unification,
elegance, etc.) figure as reasons to trust experimental results. It does however include (item 3) the
strategy of eliminating plausible sources of error and alternative explanations – what Franklin calls
“the Sherlock Holmes strategy”. As mentioned in section 2, explanatory reasoning in Franklin's case
studies seem only to play a role in suggesting hypotheses for further testing, but not in establishing
them as (probably) true or false.
6.3. Neptune and Vulcan
A final case, which  Douven (2011: sec. 1.2 & 3.2) explicitly cites as a successful application of
IBE, involves the discovery Neptune. The story here is, briefly,  the following: astronomers had
observed that the orbit of Uranus around the sun showed irregularities which were not predicted by
the standard  Newtonian theory of  gravitation.  In  response,  astronomers  John Couch Adams,  in
Cambridge, and Urbain Le Verrier, in Paris, independently produced calculations showing how this
anomaly could be explained by a hitherto unobserved planet beyond Uranus. Shortly after, in 1846,
astronomers observed this planet, which came to be named Neptune, where the calculations had
predicted it to be.
30 See also Arabatzis (2006: ch. 4) for an account of the theoretical and experimental work that led to the discovery of
electrons, including Thomson's and Zeeman's experiments.
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Notice that the astronomical community only seems to have widely accepted the existence
of Neptune after it had been observed. Thus, this case is also open to the Peircean interpretation that
Adams' and Le Verrier's calculations only justified the  pursuit of the Neptune-hypothesis. In this
case, the fact that the calculations provided concrete predictions of where to find this planet seems
crucial,  since this in effect provided guidelines for where on the night-sky to look for a planet
capable of causing the anomaly in Uranus' orbit. This greatly raised the probability that pursuing
this hypothesis would lead to astronomers learning whether it in fact existed or not. As argued in
section 4, this need not involve any additional reasons to believe that the planet actually exists.
The  aftermath  of  the  discovery  of  Neptune  provides  further  support  for  the  Peircean
analysis. Encouraged by his previous success, Le Verrier analysed the orbit of Mercury, arguing on
the basis of similar calculations that there is an additional planet between the Sun and Mercury,
which was dubbed Vulcan. Astronomers began the search for the planet, and although there were
some reported observations,  the hypothesis  in  the end produced too many failed predictions  to
convince a majority of astronomers of its existence. (The ability of Einstein's General Theory of
Relativity to explain this anomaly later came to be regarded as one of the theory's early empirical
successes).
This case is particularly relevant to Douven's direct strategy for establishing the reliability of
IBE. Since Le Verrier used fairly similar patterns of reasoning to predict  the existence of both
Neptune and Vulcan and had very little prior observational evidence of their existence, this pair of
cases seems to provide an important test of the reliability of explanatory reasoning. However, since
it only successfully predicted the existence of a planet in one case, this at best shows IBE to be of
limited reliability. The Peircean view, on the other hand, can regard both cases as instances where
explanatory reasoning  successfully  fulfilled  its  function  of  suggesting  hypotheses  for  empirical
investigation.
7. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that the Peircean view developed here provides both a normatively and a
descriptively  more  adequate  account  of  scientific  explanatory  reasoning  than  explanationism.
Firstly, the Peircean view avoids Voltaire's Objection and faces no analogous problems of its own.
Secondly, it is capable of accounting at least as well for several of the case studies usually cited by
explanationists, thus challenging empirical arguments for the reliability of IBE.
I  do  not  claim that  explanatoriness  can  never be  a  guide  to  likeliness  or  a  reason  for
accepting  a  hypothesis.  I  do  for  instance  not  rule  out  that  we  in  specific  domains  may have
knowledge  allowing  us  to  reasonably  infer  that  certain  explanatory  virtues  will  also  be  truth-
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tracking.31 But, firstly,  if this is sometimes the case, our reliance on IBE would still  depend on
independent  empirical  knowledge  about  specific  domains  of  inquiry.  Secondly,  and  more
substantially, the argument of this paper shows why we need not generally assume explanatoriness
to be a reliable guide to the truth: the Peircen view nonetheless allows us to account for the central
justificatory role of explanatory reasoning in science.
31 As suggested by Saatsi (2009); cf. Kuipers's (2002).
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